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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 21024 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
R. refers to the record on appeal. No transcript was made 
and thus none is available for the appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the county protected from prosecution and liability 
by virtue of the governmental immunity statutes (63-30-1, et seq.), 
particularly by 63-30-3, U.C.A? 
2. Do the actions of the county constitute inverse 
condemnation, and if so, is appellant entitled to maintain an 
action under Article I, Section 22, Constitution of the State of 
Utah, under the principle of inverse condemnation, to recover for 
damages and losses sustained as a result of the county's actions? 
RELEVANT PRIMARY AUTHORITIES 
1. Constitution of the State of Utah; Article 1, Section 22: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." 
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2. 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, 
all governmental entitites are immune from suit for any 
injury which results from the exercise of a governmental 
function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
"The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and employees are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
3. 63-30-10 (l)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): 
11
 (1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused . . . ." 
4. 78-34-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): 
Due to the length of this provision it is copied at the 
end of this brief as Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) Nature of the case: 
This is an appeal from two orders of dismissal dismissing 
the two causes of action in plaintiff's Amended Complaint, granted 
by the honorable Dean E. Conder, district judge, in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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(B) Statement of Facts; 
Plaintiff alleges that in May of 1984, and continuing 
for some time thereafter, Salt Lake County was engaged in the 
work of altering the stream bed of Big Cottonwood canyon, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as part of its flood control 
program. (R.2). During the course of that work the defendant, 
by and through its employees and/or agents, entered upon real 
property owned by plaintiff adjacent to, and including, the 
stream bed in said canyon, which land is more fully described 
in the original Complaint. (R. 2-3) 
Among the improvements on plaintiff's land were a cabin, 
fully furnished, landscaping, a paved driveway, steel automobile 
and foot bridges, and reinforcement and improvement of the 
stream bed and banks. (R. 3) 
During the course of the modifications to the stream bed 
by the defendant, its agents and/or employees destroyed and 
removed the bridges, most of the landscaping, all of the stream bed 
and bank improvements, and most of the driveway. (R.3) (The 
defendant county has admitted removing the bridges (R.74-75), 
but it is disputed that the removal was necessary for flood 
control, and even it was, it is disputed as to whether or not 
the county should be required to reimburse plaintiff for said 
removal.) 
It is alleged in the Complaint (R.2) and the Amended 
Complaint (R.64) that damages were sustained as a result of the 
flood waters, which flooding was allegedly due to improper changes 
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in the stream bed. However, those damages were miniscule and 
plaintiff Hansen no longer makes any claim for same and those 
matters are not at issue in this appeal. 
On or about January 25, 1985, a written "Notice of Claim" 
(R.7), as amended by amendment dated March 11, 1985 (R. 10), 
was served upon the county, pursuant to the provisions of 
17-15-10, 63-30-11, and 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), (R.5) 
On or about the 8th day of April, 19 85, the claim of the 
plaintiff was denied by the county, per a letter of even date 
(R.ll) 
On May 14, 1985, plaintiff filed his Complaint (R.2) 
against Salt Lake County for damages sustained, claiming that 
the county was responsible for the intentional destruction of 
plaintiff's landscaping, bridges, and other described improvements, 
and alleging that the county had waived its immunity to suit 
in this situation by virtue of the provisions of 63-30-10, 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
Shortly thereafter an Amended Complaint (R.64) was filed, 
wherein the allegations of the original Complaint constituted 
the First Cause of Action, and a Second Cause of Action founded 
upon the principle of inverse condemnation was added. Both causes 
of action were directed at obtaining relief for the same damages, 
approaching the basis for relief from two different principles. 
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Under two separate Motions to Dismiss (R. 12 and R. 72) the 
county moved the court to dismiss the two causes of action of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted, alleging as to the cause of action 
alleging that the county had waived its immunity to suit, that 
such immunity had not been waived, and as to the second cause of 
action, alleging that no right or claim can be founded upon 
inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
The District Court, the honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding, 
granted each motion (R. 81 and R. 99), dismissing each cause 
of action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Three primary issues are involved in this action, to-wit: 
1. It is the plaintiff's position that the county has waived 
its immunity under 63-30-10, U.C.A. Mr. Hansen does not seek 
compensation for losses sustained as a result of flooding, in which 
event the county would probably be immune. However, he does seek 
compensation for the substantial damages inflicted upon his land, 
such as the destruction of the bridges, and other improvements 
and landscaping. It is plaintiff's position that Salt Lake County 
is not immune in a situation where it causes the type of destruction 
and damages as are involved in this case, whether intentionally, 
or by neligence. 
2. Paragraph two of 63-30-3, U.C.A., concerning itself with 
-6-
the management and control of flood waters, does not, in plaintiff's 
opinion, exempt the county from responsibility for the damages 
caused to the property of Mr. Hansen. What constitutes the 
management of flood waters, and in any event, did the legislature 
intend to give governmental entities involved with flood control 
a blank check in controlling the waters, resulting in the right 
to take and/or destroy private property without any type of 
compensation, and without any limits on the powers of the 
government. Further, if the legislature did so intend, is that 
a constitutionally permitted action? 
3. The third issue revolves around inverse condemnation, 
founding a cause of action upon Article I, Section 22 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. Regardless of what the 
foregoing immunity statutes may do, as far as providing immunity 
to the county, the plaintiff submits that the taking of the 
county is a taking without just compensation, resulting in the 
plaintiff having a cause of action against the county for inverse 
condemnation. Does the principle of inverse condemantion operate 
and exist in the state of Utah, and if so, does it afford the 
plaintiff the relief he has requested in this action? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
63-30-3 U.C.A. DOES NOT EXEMPT SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THIS ACTION 
FROM LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
One of the county's primary contentions in the district court 
below was that 63-30-3, U.C.A., paragraph two, exempts the county 
from liability in this action, said paragraph stating as follows: 
-7-
"The management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be governmental 
functions, and governmental entitites and their officers 
and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities." 
At the outset it is apparent that this particular code 
provision presents a problem, to-wit: what constitutes 
"management of flood waters"? We submit that this provision is 
vague in the extreme. In interpreting a statute it is the court's 
primary responsibility to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P2d 1 (Utah, 1984) 
Can it be said that the legislature intended to permit the 
political bodies of the state of Utah to intentionally take and/or 
destroy private property of the citizens of this state without 
just compensation by the governmental entity, all in the name 
of managing flood waters? In certain cases the courts have 
permitted governmental entities to engage in the work of flood 
control with immunity from suit. But the answer to our foregoing 
question must be answered in the negative as to the facts of this 
particular case. 
We believe that in this situation we are confronted with 
a statute that is unconstitutionally vague and broad, incapable 
of a consistent and equitable interpretation. Therefore, the 
statute should be held to be unconstitutional and thus inapplicable 
as a form of relief to the defendant in this action. This is in 
keeping with the well known principle that "in general, due 
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process of law in legislation requires certainty, clearness, 
concreteness, and definiteness,and a vague or uncertain statute 
does not meet the requirements of due process, as where it is so 
vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." 
16C C.J.S. Sec. 974, p. 280. It is also generally stated that 
"the doctrine of constitutional overbreadth applies to statutes 
or regulations that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby 
substantially impinge on constitutionally protected conduct 
as well as conduct subject to governmental regulation." Ibid., 
at p. 284. 
While it is required that the courts attempt to construe 
statutes in such a way as to avoid an unconstitutional application, 
we submit that the language of the second paragraph of 6 3-30-3 is 
so broad and vague as to prohibit a proper application, it is 
highly subject to abuse by the governmental authority, and it is 
difficult, if not impossible for the courts to consistently carry 
out the intent of the legislature since the wording is so broad 
that the intent is not manifest in the statutory language. Or, 
if the intent is present, it exceeds the constitutional rights 
of the government in this instance. 
Even should this court find that the statutory provision 
is not unconstitutionally vague and broad, the subject provision 
does not protect defendant from liability in this action for 
several reasons. First, reason and common sense dictate that the 
legislature did not intend to permit a governmental body of this 
state to intentionally or wrecklessly take and/or damage private 
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property without just compensation. The county's actions in 
this matter constitute, in addition to any cause of action that 
may arise out of their actions as set forth in the Complaint, an 
inverse condemnation and taking of property of the plaintiff. 
(This issue is discussed infra.) To adopt the defendant's 
position in this case one would have to take the position 
that a governmental body could take their equipment and destroy 
private property without compensation, as long as such actions 
were done in connection with the "management" of flood waters 
or involving any type of flood threat. 
Second, the actions taken by the county do not fall under 
the scope of the cited code section for the following two reasons: 
first, flood waters were not being managed. The actions complained 
of were conducted by defendant prior to the flooding period. No 
actual control of existing flooding waters was under way. The 
flooding occurred at a future date. Second, the actions were not 
taken or conducted in connection with the " . . . construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems . . . " since 
the Big Cottonwood stream bed is a naturally existing water 
carrying system, and thus does not constitute a flood or storm 
system as contemplated under the statute. 
Finally , the county presented to the court below authorities 
wherein the facts did not square with the facts of this action. 
In the matter of Brakensiek v. Sandy City, et al., Civil No. 
C-84-0564 (R.27) the facts were that the plaintiffs had been 
injured because of ground and surface water problems from a flood 
control pond that the governmental entity had permitted a 
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contractor to construct. In the matter of National Mfg. Co. v. 
U.S., 210 F2d 263, the plaintiffs had sued the government for 
damages allegedly incurred from erroneous flood and weather 
reports. In Coates v. U.S., 181 F2d 816, flooding downstream 
occurred as a result of defendant's work on changin the course of 
the Missouri River. In U.S. v. Gregory, 300 F2d 11, the dreging 
by the government of certain canals in the area of the property 
owner's fish ponds caused those ponds to dry up because the ground 
water level was reduced. In U.S. v. Ure, 225 F2d 709, flooding 
occurred as a result of a break in an irrigation supply canal 
maintained by the government. The list goes on and on, without 
a single case involving a situation as we have here where the 
court was confronted with a matter involving the taking of 
private property for a governmental use. We could find no fact 
situations in any of the cases cited by the county to the district 
court that even remotely coincide with the facts of this action. 
While the facts of these cases may apply to water damage caused to 
plaintiff's property, they do not apply to the crux of this 
plaintiff's claim, which is that the intentional or wreckless 
acts of the county took and destroyed his privately owned property, 
with no subsequent attempt to replace the property destroyed, or to 
compensate the plaintiff for the taking. While the county cited 
a variety of authorities to the district court in support of 
their argument, we fail to see any authority cited that applies 
to the fact situation of this case and upon which the district 
court was entitled to rely in making its decision. 
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In summary, as to this point, it can be stated as follows: 
First, the second paragraph of the cited code provision is 
unconstitutionally vague and broad. How can one determine what 
constitutes a management of flood waters, and what limits are 
to be placed upon the government in implementing the control of 
any flood threat. 
Second, even if the statute is constitutional, this court 
has stated that the intent of the legisltaure must control. We 
have serious doubts that the legislature intended to override 
the constitutionally protected rights of the citizens by the 
enactment of this section. In fact, in the matter of Utah State 
Road Com'n. v. Friberg, 687 P2d 821, at 831 (Utah, 1984), this 
court stated that in interpreting a statute the courts are 
required to " . . . construe statutory terms to avoid an 
unconstitutional application of the statute." To construe this 
statute as giving a shield to the county in this situation would 
result in an application that would permit other takings of the 
property without just compensation. 
Third, the defendant cited no authority to the district 
court where the facts squared with those of this action, and thus 
there were no cogent authorities upon which to base a decision. 
We do not have here damages due to flooding resulting from the 
implementation of a basic program, but rather, the wanton and 
intentional destruction of private property belonging to the 
plaintiff. 
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Fourth, the statute does not apply to this situation because 
there is no actual management of flood waters owing to the 
fact that no flooding was occurring, and further, there was no 
injury resulting from the repair or operation of a flood or 
storm system. 
POINT II: 
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION IS WAIVED BY THIS DEFENDANT IN 
THIS ACTION BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF 63-30-10 U.C.A. 
In the countyfs argument to the district court it was 
argued that the plaintiff is not entitled to bring his action 
under 6 3-30-10 U.C.A. by virtue of the rather unique notion that 
the plaintiff must name and sue an actual employee, rather than 
the actual governmental entity itself. (R.21) The court will 
note that the statute itself states that "immunity from suit 
of all governmental entities is waived . . .", then going on, but 
waiving the immunity as to the governmental entity itself. [Emphasis 
added] We need not state at this time who the employees were, nor 
are we required to put on proof as to the actual individuals 
involved at this point in in the proceedings. A governmental 
entity must, by necessity, act through its employees. It is not 
a living organism that acts on its own volition, but rather, is 
an entity created by law, consisting of its employees, and 
functioning entirely through them. 
It is the plaintifffs position that the damages he has 
sustained were inflicted upon him by the intentional and/or 
-13-
negligent acts of the county. Those acts, whether intentional 
or negligent in nature, resulted in a taking of real property 
and fixtures without just compensation. We submit that 
63-30-10 waives immunity in such a situation, and that the 
district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action. 
Defendant, however, argues that subsection (1) of the cited code 
provision provides immunity to the county. This section provides 
as follows: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of his employment except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function, whether or not the discrection 
is abused. . . . " 
In the case of Frank v. State of Utah, et al., 613 P2d 
517, (Utah, 1980), the state of Utah endeavored to invoke the 
defense of governmental immunity arising out of the acts or 
omissions of an employee employed by a governmentally owned 
health care facilityQ In rejecting the state's claim or contention 
of immunity this Supreme Court noted: 
"In Carroll v. State Road Commission, this Court recognized 
that almost all acts require some degree of discretion, and 
observed that the exception to the waiver set forth in 
the Act should be confined to those decisions and acts 
occurring at the 'basic policy-making level,1 and not 
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the 
operational level, or, in other words, ' . . . those which 
concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation 
of broad policy facts." 
" . . . The exception to the statutory waiver here under 
consideration, however, was intended to shield those 
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governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers 
of people in myriad of unforeseeable ways from individual 
and class legal actions, the continual threat of which 
would make public administration all but impossible• The 
one-to-one dealings of physician and patient in no way 
reflect this public policy-making posture, and should not 
be given shelter under the Act. We therefore hold that 
immunity is waived by operation of the Act, and that the 
State of Utah may not escape liability by reason thereof." 
While the defendant cited various federal and other authoritiej 
to the district court which attempted in a round-about way to 
define the intent and scope of this code provision, we believe that 
the Frank case, supra., provides excellent guidance for the court 
in determining what constitutes a governmental discretionary act. 
We submit that the acts involved in this case do not constitute 
a discretionary act at the basic policy making level. If 
Mr. Hansen were complaining about damages caused by the flood 
control efforts in general, then perhaps defendant would have 
a point. However, we believe that the facts in this case will 
clearly show that the individual employees in this instance 
interpreted the plan to modify the stream bed as giving them 
the right to buldoze through private property, ripping and destroying 
with impunity as they went. This was never intended, I trust, even 
at the policy making level. Thus, it seems apparent that the 
underlying policy had not been to take and destroy private 
property without compensation or restoration, and this being the 
case, immunity is waived in this instance. 
On the other hand, even if the county's policy had been to 
take without compensation, this would be contrary to constitution-
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ally protected rights of the plaintiff, and others so affected, 
raising the issue of inverse condemnation. 
The result of these arguments reveals two courses of 
action available to the plaintiff, and which courses we believe 
this court must validate. The first is to determine that 
6 3-30-3 is too vague, and perhaps, at the same time, too broad, 
in its wording and impact, resulting in the act being uncon-
stitutional. This results in the loss of a shield for the county 
under this provision. This court should then determine that 
immunity has been waived under 63-30-10, for the negligent and/ 
or intentional torts of the county. Basically, we urge this court 
to find that it was not the intent of the legislature to shield 
the governmental entities of this state from situations where 
private property is destroyed, and/or taken and converted to the 
uses of such entities, that 63-30-3 was never intended as a 
shield in such situations, and if it was, it violates the 
constitutional guarantees provided under Article I, Section 22, 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The second course of action for the plaintiff is to seek 
relief under the principle of inverse condemnation, discussed 
hereinbelow. 
POINT III: 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST 
SALT LAKE COUNTY UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION 
In plaintiff's Amended Complaint (R.64) a second cause of 
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action was filed wherein plaintiff makes his claim for damages 
based upon the principle of inverse condemnation. We submit 
that a claim for damages and compensation based upon this 
principle constitutes a valid claim against the sovereign and its 
agencies, and that the district court committed error in granting 
a motion to dismiss our action founded upon this basis. 
This particular issue has been the subject of considerable 
discussion in numerous cases dealt with by this Supreme Court. 
At the very root of the issue of inverse condemnation lies the 
constitutional safeguard and provision as set forth in Article If 
Section 22, of the Utah State Constitution, which provides that 
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation." [Emphasis added] 
In the case of State of Utah, by and through its Road 
Commission v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 94 Ut. 384, 78 P2d 
502, the court said: "We think it is clear that the framers of 
the Constitution did not intend to give the rights granted by 
Section 22, and then leave the citizens powerless to enforce 
such rights." 
One of the principle issues presented by this constitutional 
provision is whether or not the State, and its agencies and 
political subdivisions, have impliedly granted consent to be sued 
by adopting said constitutional provision. Such construction and 
rule was adopted in the case of Chick Springs Water Company v. 
State Highway Department, 159 SC 481, 157 S.E. 842Q See also 
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the case of State v. Fourth Judicial District Courty supra,, 
wherein this court ruled as follows: 
"We think it is clear that the framers of the 
Constitution did not intend to give the rights granted by 
Section 22, and then leave the citizens powerless to 
enforce such rights. We hold that this is so whether the 
injury complained of by the plaintiffs in the injunction 
suit is considered a 'taking' of property, or a 'damaging* 
of property. The framers of the fundamental law, after 
much debate and careful consideration of the hardship of 
the old rule which allowed compensation only in the case 
of a taking of property, wrote into the Constitution a 
provision by which we think they intended to guarantee 
to the landowner whose property is damaged just compensation 
with the same certainty as to the landowner whose property 
is physically taken." 
There can be no question that the Constitution is recognized 
as the supreme law of the land; that it is paramount to all 
statutory enactments; and that the State Legislature has no 
authority to enact laws contrary to constitutional provisions and 
that the courts must enforce the constitutional safeguards with 
or without legislative implementation. 
A number of cases have recognized the rights of property 
owners to seek redress for damages in cases similar to the subject 
case. See Great Northern Railway Company v. State, 173 P. 40 
(Wash., 1918), and Rose v. State, 94 P2d 1053 (Cal.). In the 
case of Renniger v. State, 213 P2d 911 (Idaho)f the plaintiffs 
instituted a suit against the state of Idaho for damages sustained 
to their lands as a result of flooding created by the construction 
of a bridge across a river and a change of grade in highway 
construction. In that case, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected 
the State's contention that it was not liable for the damages and 
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noted as follows: 
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, 
if in construing a provision of constitutional law, always 
understood to have been adopted for protection and security 
to the rights of the individual as against the government, 
and which has received the commendation of jurists, states-
men and commentators as placing the just principles of the 
common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary 
legislation to change or control them, it shall be held 
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion 
of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy 
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent 
injury to any extent; can, in effect, subject it to total 
destruction without making any compensation, because in the 
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public 
use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional 
provision into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, 
as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the 
government, and make it an authority for invasion of private 
right under the pretext of the public good, which had no 
warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors." 
In a more recent case, Walker v. Idaho Board of Highway 
Directors, 524 P2d 169, (Idaho), the Supreme Court of Idaho once 
again noted that "when real property was 'taken1 by the State with-
out any compensation, such conduct results in a cause of action on 
behalf of the landowner in 'inverse condemnation." In the Walker 
case, the Idaho court cites various authorities for the proposition 
that where land has been "taken" by the sovereign without 
instituting formal condemnation proceedings, a cause of action 
exists against the sovereign under the constitutional authority 
for damages based upon inverse condemnation. 
Two of our sister states have recognized the right of 
inverse condemnation where private property has been taken or 
damaged for public use, recognizing the constitutional right to 
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be compensated for private property taken for public use provided 
the use is of a permanent or continuing nature. In City of Yuma 
v. Lattie, 572 P2d 108 (Ariz.), the Supreme Court of Arizona, in 
recognizing a constitutional provision identical with that of 
the State of Utah, noted: 
"An examination of many authorities from various juris-
dictions convinces us that the weight of authority in the 
United States is to the effect that either the destruction 
or the material impairment of the access easement of an 
abutting property owner to [such] highway is compensable. 
* * * * Our State Constitution . . . prohibits the taking 
or damaging of private property for public use without 
just compensation. It follows that the State can neither 
take nor damage said easement of ingress or egress of an 
abutting property owner without just compensation." 
The court went on to note that in case of damage caused to 
private property by the accumulation and sudden release of waters 
thereby creating a flood which inundated the lands of the private 
property owner was actionable and compensable under the theory 
of inverse condemnation. The court therein stating: "This 
action is one in inverse eminent domain, not negligence, and the 
issues on that theory were properly raised and tried." 
While it is immediately obvious that these authorities 
give weight to the argument that the county in this action is 
responsible for the small amount of flood damage, they, at the 
same time give a clear indication that the county is liable for 
the intentional taking and destruction of the plaintiff's private 
property. As noted in the authorities cited, the Constitution is 
designed and created for the purpose of protecting the private 
rights of the citizens against the sovereign, and to hold that 
the sovereign must enact statutes to authorize proper redress 
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for a violation of constitutional rights seems illogical and 
contrary to the weight of authorities and better reasoned cases 
on this subject. 
CONCLUSION 
For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must be assumed 
that the facts as stated in the Complaint and the Amended 
Complaint are true. Such a motion has the effect of a general 
demurrer. Given this situation we submit to this court that 
the facts as pled by plaintiff constitute two valid claims under 
the laws of this state. The immunity of the county has been waived, and 
the second paragraph of 63-30-3 does not afford the county a blank 
check to do what they may with private property all in the name 
of controlling flood waters. 
Furthermore, it is clear that a right of inverse condemnation 
exists under Article I, Section 22 of our constitution. To uphold 
the rulings of the district court, and to adopt the reasoning 
of the county, one would have to conclude that a governmental 
agency may rip through, destroy and take private property in the 
course of any work connected with flood control. One could even 
carry it one step further and state that the county's position 
is that it can take private property, or damage it, for any 
purpose without paying just compensation as long as no formal 
eminent domain proceedings had been commenced by it. If this is 
not the county's position then one can only conclude that a right 
to inverse condemnation exists in the injured party. 
. 2 i -
It is inconceivable that the county * :; s situation 
should h~ ' - A-. • * - . • • , . : - property 
of t.ne ..Ldiuu:: , eithei ov its negligence, or its omissions, 
and/or by intentional acts committ^* : * - * i ] • i wanton disregard 
of * '^  : . . . - . . • - / _I:ILV . c-ai .
 ; think 
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2. That the case be remanded for a determination of the 
damages sustained by the plaintiff. 
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3. That this court rule that the county's immunity has been 
waived under 63-30-10, U.C.A. 
4. That this court rule that the county's immunity is not 
maintained by virtue of 63-30-3, U.C.A, 
5. That this court rule that the principle of inverse 
condemnation is an appropriate remedy for relief for property 
owners in this state, and in particular, for this plaintiff, and 
further rule that the plaintiff has stated an adequate cause of 
action to obtain such relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
\LL 
'Attofneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE 
ms-im Judicial Code 78-34-1 
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, 
creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui 
que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the 
estate of ft decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent, 
may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in 
respect thereto: 
(i) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, 
legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or, 
(2) To direct the executors, administrators or 
trustee*, to do or abstain from doing any particular 
»actta their fiduciary capadty; or, 
(3)t^deterinine any • question arising in the ad-
the esute or^tntst^iinchidint 
of1 construction of^wffls^tnd* other 
writh** im 
71-33-5. Eunera tkH^ia precedlag jections no res-
tnc iwa # • couwt a general powers* 
T l * f enumeration in -sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 
and 7*-334.does not limit or restrict,the exercise of 
the general powers •conferred in section 78-31-1 jn 
any peocfrding where declaratory relief i s sought, in 
which M judgment or decree will terminate the cont-
roversy or remove an uncertainty. 1953 
7943-f . Discretion to deny declaratory relief. 
H ie court may refuse to render or enter a declar-
atory judgment or decree where such judgment or 
decree, i f rendered or entered, would not terminate 
the uncertainty, or controversy giving,rise to the
 ( 
proceeding. 1953 
7133-7. Appeals and reviews. 
AH orders, judgments and decrees under this 
chapter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments 
and decrees. 1953 
7*33*. Snppitsifaial nsflef. 
Further relief based o n a^dedaratory judgment or 
decree may be granted , whenever necessary or 
proper. The application therefor shall be by petition 
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If 
(he application is deemed sufficient, the court shall, 
on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, 
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declarat-
ory judgment or decree, to show cause why further 
relief should not be granted forthwith. 1953 
71-33-9. Trial ©t tones of fact. 
When a proceeding under this chapter involves 
the determination of an issue of fact, such issue 
may be tried and determined in the same manner as 
issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil 
actions in the court in which the proceeding is 
pending. 1953 
79-33-19. Costs. 
In any proceeding under thi* chapter, the court , 
may make such award o f costs as may seem 
equitable and just. 1953 
79-&41>»afte. 
When declaratory relief is sought aUbpersdhst shall 
be made parties who have or claim any interest 
vhkh would be a f f e c t s by the declaration! and no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights o f persons not 
parties t o the proceecLing. In any proceeding which 
involve* the validity of a municipals or county 
ordinance or franchise such municipality or county 
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be 
heard, and if a statute or state franchise or permit 
a alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be 
served with a copy o f the proceeding and be entitled 
to be heard. i9S3 
78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed. 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its 
purpose is t o settle and to afford relief from uncer-
tainty and, insecurity with respect to rights, status 
and other legal relations; and is to be liberally 
construed and administered. 1953 
79-33-13. "Person" defined. 
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, 
shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, 
joint stock company, "unincorporated association or 
society, or municipal or other corporation o f any 
character whatsoever. 1953 
Chapter 34. Eminent Domain 
79-34-1, Uies for wnka rig** may be exercised. 
71-34-2. Estates ami rights taat may be takes. 
79-343. Private property which may be taken. 
79444 . .Condition*, precedent to taking. 
79-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location. 
79-344. Complaint - Contents. 
79-34-7, Whtf may appear and defend. 
79-34-9;< Power* of court or fudge. 
79-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit 
paid into court * Procedure for payment of compensati-
on. 
79-34-10. Compensation and damages - How assessed. 
79-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued. 
79-34*12. When title sought found defective - Another 
action allowed. 
79-34-13. Payment of award - Bond from railroad to 
secure fencing. 
79-34*14.- Execution for - Annulment of proceedings on 
failure to pay. 
79-34-15. Jadgment of condemnation - Recordation -
Effect. 
79-34-16. Occupancy of premises pending action,- Substit-
ution of bond for*deposit paid into court • Abandonm-
ent of action by condemner. 
79-34-17. Rights of cities and towns not affected. 
79-34-19. When right of way acquired - Duty of parry 
acquiring. 
79-34-19. Action to set aside condemnation for failure to 
commence or complete construction within reasonable 
time. 
79-34-20* Sale of property obtained by eminent domain 
79-34*1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right 
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of 
the following public uses: 
(1) All public uses authorized
 #by the government 
of the United States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of 
the state, and all other public uses authorized by the 
legislature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of 
any county, city or incorporated town, or board of 
education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, 
ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of 
the inhabitants'of any county,or city or incorpora-
ted town, or for the draining of any county, city or 
incorporated? town; the raising* of the banks of 
streams, removing
 u obstructions therefrom, and 
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; 
roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses 
for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated 
town, or the inhabitants thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, femes , 
bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike 
r o a d s / roads for transportation by traction engines 
or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbenng 
purposes, and railroads and street railways for 
public transportation. 
^(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, 
78-34-1 Judich 
flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pirjei^bf^the 
supplying of persons, mines, mills', amelterfror^other 
works for the reduction of ores,- withfwater for 
domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, 
or for the draining and reclaiming of lands, or for 
the floating of logs and lumber on streams not na-
vigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other 
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution. ; %• 
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, .ditches, 
flumes, pipes and dumping places to facilitate the 
milling, smelting or other reduction of? ores, ^ ot "the 
working of mines, quarries, coal mines or. mineral 
deposits including minerals in solution; outlets, 
natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct; of 
tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or 
other works for the reduction of ores, of* from 
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits 
inducting minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or 
coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any 
subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the 
underground storage of natural gas, and in connec-
tion therewith such other interests in property Tas 
may be required adequately to examine, prepare, 
maintain, and operate such underground natural gas 
storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds*and 
other facilities for, the recovery of minerals' in 
solution; also any occupancy in common by the 
owners or possessors of different mines, .quarries, 
coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or 
other places for the reduction of ores, or any place 
for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse 
matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from hign*ays to residences 
and farms. 
(8) Telegraph, telephone; electric light and electric 
power'lines, and sites for electric light and power 
plants. 
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settl-
ement of not less than ten families, or of any public 
building belonging to the state, nr of anv college or 
university. 
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, 
aqueducts and pipes for supplying and storing water 
for the operation of machinery for the purpose of 
generating and transmitting electricity for power, 
light or heat. 
(11) Cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any 
and all liquids connected with the manufacture of 
beet sugar. 
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or otner works tor 
the reduction of ores and necessary to the successful 
operation thereof, including the right to take lands 
for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, 
fumes and dust therefrom, produced by the 
operation of such works; provided, that the powers 
granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in 
any county where the population exceeds twenty 
thousand, or within one mile of the limits of any 
city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed 
condemner has the right to operate by purchase, 
option to purchase or easement, at least seventy-
five percent in value of land acreage owned by 
persons or corporations situated within a radius of 
four miles from the mill, smelter or othdr works for 
the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of said 
four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contr-
acts/easements or agreements existing between the 
condemner and the owner of land within said limit 
and providing for the operation of such mill, 
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; 
nor until an action shall have been commenced to 
< u u w u i y j w i w 
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or $ /ermanent biddings. Tor reia 
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therebyi^orffo^an.iputk-
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smelter or other piace^forjtht 
£pr<«plat>^eyapwrtfem ootids 
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where surface 
coal or other c . _ 
extracfidn, only a i 
over the surface groi 
(2) An easement, when taken for any otl 
(3) The right of entry uportv and-oc 
lands, with the "right to tike therefrom 
gravel,' stones^trees *»•* •*««**-«• « * • » » 
for some publicise. 
78-34-3. Private property wok 
The private property whicl 
this chapter indudes?*~ : ^ ^ * g & | 
(I)'A11 real propertybdongmjfto M$fy8kaL$ 
• (2) 'Lands belonging* to* the * state, or to 
county, city or incorporated1 town, not aporootiatdf 
to some public use. 
(3) Property appropriated to pun 
that such property shall not be taken unless fori 
more necessary public use than that to which it fc& 
been already appropriated. 
(4) Franchises for toll roads, toil bridges, ferric' 
and all other franchises; provided, that such frasa 
hises shall not.be taken unless for free highways, 
railroads,' or other more necessary public use; 
: (5) All • rights of way for any and all' purpose 
mentioned in section 78-34-1 hereof, and any ant 
all structures-and* improvements thereon, and the 
lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be 
subject to be connected with; crossed or intersected 
by any other right' -of way or improvement « 
structure thereon; they?-shall also be subject- to 2 
limited use in common, with the.owners thereof,| 
when necessary; but such,uses of crossings, 
ctions and connections shall be made in the i 
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and] 
the least private injury.. 
(6) All classes of private property not enum* 
may be taken for public use when such tak 
authorized by law. 
78-34-4. Conditions precedent io iakmg, 
'\ Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be apolicd h ;, 
use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such .use, . 
(3) That*construction and u$c>ol+M <prc 
sought to be condemned will commcoce^witL „ 
reasonable time as determined by the courts after 
the initiation of proceedings under this chapter; and 
(4) If already appropriated^ some publicuae; 
that the public use to which it is to be annli«d is a 
more necessary public u s c ^ , f<t&at*-. m 
78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and locatioa. 
In all cases where land is required for public 
the person/' or IBs agent, in charge of such use mat 
survey and locate the same; but it must be located 
in the manner which will be most compatible whs 
the greatest public good and the least private injury, 
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